Sun 04 Mar 2007 11:00:06 PM UTC, comment #4:
Several of my mail passwords are really account passwords, in the sense that they control access to more than just a single mailbox. These passwords govern access to outside resources, such as other computers, services, and file systems. That makes them significantly more sensitive than any other piece of data in my local file system.
Honestly, if I had to choose between revealing the contents of my mail spool (which is cached in the local file system) and revealing my mail password, I would prefer to leak my mail spool. My mail passwords are significantly more sensitive than the contents of my INBOX at any moment in time.
Given that passwords are more sensitive than most other data in the local file system, it is perfectly reasonable to place stronger protections around them.
Futhermore, passwords are few in number and individually small, so strong encryption of passwords may be more reasonable from a performance standpoint than a completely encrypted home directory. From a technical/deployment standpoint, it is also much easier to integrate encryption into the access-control parts of selected applications than it is to roll out real kernel-supported encrypted file systems.
So, to sum up: (1) passwords are more sensitive than other file system data and therefore warrant stronger protections, and (2) ecrypting passwords is quite practical from a technical standpoint whereas encrypting an entire home directory is nice in theory, but problematic in practice.
Jean-Yves, it sounds like you have a basic philosophical objection to password encryption. You keep answering every request with "Why, why, why?" Can you tell us why you think this is a bad idea? What is your objection? You apparently have one or several concerns, but have not yet articulated any. I'm trying to present my rationale as clearly as possible. Please do the same.
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